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The Applicability of Aesthetic Knowledge in Organizational Decision Making Processes 
 
Thomas Keenan, Anne Pisarski and Jennifer Bartlett 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
We argue that aesthetic knowledge, which is a form of tacit knowledge of beauty and 
related concepts, is an important, yet under-researched, topic in the study of organizational 
decision making processes.  The significance of aesthetic knowledge for decision making 
processes is derived from its universal application by humans to commonplace practices; its use 
as the basis of decision criteria in complex situations to which the effective application of logic 
and reason is difficult; and its role both in assisting cognition in general and in enabling the 
choice of solutions generated from rational decision making processes. Despite its importance, 
the empirical research examining the application of aesthetic knowledge in organizational 
decision making processes is limited. Further detailed study of aesthetic knowledge in the 
context of organizational decision making processes is required to extend the recent movement 
in the field aimed at examining the role that extrarational, human-centered factors play in 
organizational decisions.  
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The Applicability of Aesthetic Knowledge in Organizational Decision Making Processes 
 
Thomas Keenan, Anne Pisarski and Jennifer Bartlett 
 
It is our aim in this paper to explore the applicability of tacit knowledge in organizational 
decision making processes, focusing specifically on the application of aesthetic knowledge (as a 
form of tacit knowledge) in these processes. We argue that aesthetic knowledge is an important 
concept in decision making processes, as it is a form of sensory knowing that is a universal 
attribute of humans, and one which is applied on an everyday basis to commonplace practices, 
including decision making (Davey, 1989; Dean, Ottensmeyer, & Ramirez, 1997; Edman, 
1928/39; Featherstone, 2007; Hammermeister, 2002; Saito, 2001; Taylor, 2000). Further, 
aesthetic knowledge is significant for decision making processes in organizations, given its 
potential use as the ultimate basis of the criteria on which decisions are made in complex and 
unpredictable situations to which the application of logic and reason is difficult (Agor, 1986; 
Davey, 1989). Finally, the role of aesthetic knowledge both in assisting cognition in general 
(Hansen, Ropo, & Sauer, 2007; Ramirez, 2005) and in enabling the choice among multiple 
solutions derived from rational decision making processes (Hansen et al., 2007) provides 
additional impetus for considering aesthetic knowledge in the context of decision making in 
organizations. Despite this importance, no empirical research has been conducted examining the 
application of aesthetic knowledge in organizational decision making processes.  
 
We begin this paper by exploring the existing theory of decision making processes and 
the application of tacit knowledge in decision making. As part of this exploration, we define our 
conceptualizations of both ‘decision’ and ‘knowledge’. Given the contested nature of these 
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terms, we believe that this is important for contextualizing our discussion. We then consider the 
nature of aesthetic knowledge, and the existing literature on aesthetics and decision making, to 
explain our understanding of aesthetic knowledge, and to demonstrate the lack of existing 
empirical research examining aesthetic knowledge and decision making processes. We conclude 
by reiterating the importance of considering aesthetic knowledge in organizational decision 
making processes as part of the recent movement in the field against “dehumanizing” decision 
making (Langley, Mintzberg, Pitcher, Posada, & Saint-Macary, 1995), and the increased 
attention researchers are paying to “extrarational”, tacit knowledges in the study of decision 
making processes in organizations (e.g. Agor, 1986; Brockmann & Anthony, 2002; Langley et 
al., 1995; McKenzie, van Winkelen, & Grewal, 2011; Simon, 1987). While the literature 
suggests a potential role for the application of aesthetic knowledge in decision making processes 
in organizations, we argue that detailed empirical research is required to establish effectively the 
exact nature of this role. Such research would, we maintain, make a significant contribution to 
the theory and practice of decision making processes in organizations. 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION MAKING PROCESSES 
Decision making processes represent a significant area of interest for both researchers 
and practitioners within the field of organizational studies. This interest is based primarily on the 
assumption that all organizations and their activities are derived from the decisions made by 
members of those organizations; and that the efficacy of these decisions determines the success 
or failure of an organization (Choo, 1998). A ‘decision’ is “a commitment to a course of action 
that is intended to yield results that are satisfying for specified individuals” (Yates & Tschirhart, 
2006, cf. Langley et al., 1995: 261). To arrive at this commitment to action, decision makers 
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must engage in processes aimed at first establishing and then choosing among various options 
relating to the matter under consideration (Choo, 1998). An extensive variety of decisions 
regarding every aspect of an organization is made by individuals and groups within organizations 
on a moment-by-moment basis.  
 
Research into decision making in organizational contexts has been conducted from a 
broad range of theoretical perspectives, including psychology, sociology, economics, 
anthropology and management (Gore, Banks, Millward, & Kyriakidou, 2006). Langley et al. 
(1995: 260) argue that the theoretical models that have emerged from this varied research have 
“been stuck along a continuum between the cerebral rationality of the stage theories at one end 
and the apparent irrationality of the theory of organized anarchies at the other”. Organizational 
decision making research was focused initially on staged or ‘rational’ decision making processes. 
These theories are derived primarily from the work of Barnard (1938) and are often referred to as 
‘rational’ or ‘optimizing’ models of decision making. Rational models involve the use of reason 
in decision making processes to arrive at a result which produces the optimal outcome as 
identified by the decision makers (Cray, Inglis, & Freeman, 2007). The primary rational model is 
based around a clearly defined and staged decision making process involving defining a problem, 
identifying appropriate decision criteria, allocating weight to each criterion, developing 
alternative solutions to the problem, evaluating each solution against the weighted criteria, and 
selecting the ‘best’ (i.e. optimal) alternative (Harrison, 1999). This model is based on a particular 
set of assumptions, namely that the nature of the problem that is identified is apparent; the 
solution options are known and understood; the decision criteria preferences of decision makers 
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are clear and consistent; there is an absence of time constraints; and the ‘best’ alternative is that 
which results in “maximum payoff” (March, 1994).  
 
The key model at the organized anarchy end of the spectrum is the “garbage can” model 
of decision making (Cohen, March, & Olson, 1972). This model suggests that the decision 
making is a complex, ambiguous and chaotic process consisting of four elements – problems, 
solutions, participants and choice opportunities (Cray et al., 2007). Each of these elements exists 
concurrently in an organizational context; and when a decision situation arises, existing 
“problems and solutions become linked in random or serendipitous ways driven by the hazards 
and vagaries of participation in choices” (Langley et al., 1995: 263). This model represents a 
reactionary conceptualisation of decision making compared to the proactive nature of the rational 
model (Cray et al., 2007). 
 
Existing decision making models have been the subject of repeated and varied criticism. 
The primary basis of the criticism of the rational model is the rejection of the assumptions which 
underpin the model. It can be argued, for example, that there are very few situations which 
conform to the stability, predictability, simplicity, clarity and temporal assumptions on which the 
rational model is based. Rather, decisions are often made in complex situations, characterised by 
incomplete knowledge and high levels of uncertainty relating to both the goals being pursued and 
the consequences of choice options (Robbins, Millett, Cacioppe, & Waters-Marsh, 2001). The 
‘myth of rationality’ – that is, the inability of humans to act in the completely rational manner 
underpinning the rational model – has also been a basis for criticism. Simon (1957) was the first 
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theorist to suggest that humans make decisions under the constraints of “bounded rationality”. 
He argued that 
[t]he capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex problems is small 
compared with the size of the problems whose solution is required for objectively rational 
behavior in the real world – or even for a reasonable approximation to such objective 
rationality (Simon, 1957: 198). 
 
In particular, limited time and mental capacity, incomplete knowledge, value and purpose 
conflicts and biases among decision participants (especially in an organizational context), and 
the complexity of many decision situations render complete rationality impossible (Buchanan & 
O'Connell, 2006; Choo, 1998; Cray et al., 2007). Rather, decision makers often attempt to 
simplify decision making processes by relying on “routines, rules and heuristics… in order to 
reduce uncertainty and cope with complexity” (Choo, 1998: 12, cf. Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) 
to arrive at a ‘satisficing’ solution – that is, one that is ‘good enough’, as opposed to ‘optimal’ 
(Robbins et al., 2001). In an organizational context, these “routines, rules and heuristics” are 
often derived from expertise in a particular field (Gore et al., 2006). 
 
Langley et al. (1995) offer criticisms of both extremes of the decision making continuum. 
While they accept the untenable nature of the rational model, they also reject the complete 
anarchical view of decision making as proposed by the ‘garbage can’ metaphor, suggesting that 
it may result in the failure to consider “other important but as yet unexplained forms of order in 
the processes we call decisional” (Langley et al., 1995: 262). Langley et al. (1995) argue that the 
existing literature covering the entire continuum suffers from three key problems: reification, 
dehumanization, and isolation. Reification refers to the objective assumption of a clearly 
identifiable ‘decision’, which, they suggest, reflects the “bias towards viewing organizations as 
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mechanistic and bureaucratic” (Langley et al., 1995: 264). They argue that ‘decision’ is a 
construct, rather than an objective ‘thing’. Dehumanization is conceptualised as the propensity in 
the extant literature to remove humanity from the decision making process, especially in terms of 
emotion and imagination. Langley et al. (1995: 264) maintain that these “arational forces are 
ignored in almost all of the literature” [emphasis in original]. This lack of consideration of these 
‘forces’ is problematic, as “decision making processes are driven by the emotion, imagination 
and memories of the decision makers and are punctuated by sudden crystallizations of thought” 
(Langley et al., 1995: 261). Isolation refers to the lack of consideration of the “collective reality” 
of organizational life (Langley et al., 1995: 264). Decision making is often viewed as an 
individual phenomenon, without considering effectively the role of extra-individual forces and 
collective action in decisions. Based on these criticisms of existing decision making theory, 
Langley et al. (1995) offer a “convergence” model of decision making. This model suggests that 
“instead of a decision appearing at a point in time, decision making follows a general 
trajectory… of gradual convergence on the image of some final action” (Langley et al., 1995: 
266). This convergence process is guided by decision makers, who, as people, bring 
“extrarational” processes (i.e. subconscious processes of judgment, intuition, ‘insight’ and other 
tacit knowledges, such as, we argue, aesthetic knowledge) to bear as part of the decision making 
process.  
 
The convergence model proposed by Langley et al. (1995) shares similarities with the 
intuitive model of decision making, which refers to an “unconscious process [of decision 
making] created out of distilled experience” (Robbins et al., 2001: 173). This model is not 
necessarily anti-rational; rather it may be entirely rational to apply this intuitive approach in 
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situations characterised by high uncertainty, a lack of precedence, unpredictable variables, 
limited knowledge, time and clarity, multiple possible solutions, and in instances when analytical 
data are useless. Under these conditions, we would argue that the only effective way of making a 
decision may be the subconscious application of the intuitive, tacit knowledge decision makers 
have as a result of their experience.  
 
Despite the pervasiveness of rationality in both theory and practice as the ultimate 
desirable state for decision making processes in organizations, the literature clearly suggests that 
the rational ideal is unachievable. Langley et al. (1995) argue that accepting the anarchical 
position of the opposite end of the decision making theory continuum is also flawed. Rather than 
focusing on trying to improve the rationality of decision making processes, or abandoning the 
study of decision making processes to the forces of anarchy, the focus of research should be on 
the reality of what actually occurs when people engage in decision making processes in 
organizations. This necessarily means exploring the role of extrarational or non-rational 
processes (as provided for in the convergence and intuitive models) in decision making in an 
organizational context. While this has been achieved to a certain extent, especially in terms of 
intuition and emotion in decision making (see e.g. Agor, 1986; Simon, 1987), there has been no 
empirical consideration of the role of aesthetic knowledge as an extrarational force in decision 
making processes. This is a gap in existing decision making process theory which we argue 
needs to be addressed. Before we explore this argument specifically, however, it is necessary to 
consider the existing theory surrounding the application of tacit knowledge in decision making 
processes. 
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TACIT KNOWLEDGE AND DECISION MAKING PROCESSES 
In order to explore effectively the extant theory relating to the application of tacit 
knowledge in decision making processes, it is important to define what we mean by 
‘knowledge’. The traditional epistemological definition of knowledge per se is “justified true 
belief” (Nonaka, Toyama, & Konno, 2000; Steup, 1996). However, in applied terms, this 
definition is insufficient as it fails to address even the most fundamental cognitive, social and 
cultural issues of what knowledge ‘is’ and how it ‘comes to be’ (Nonaka et al., 2000). We have 
adopted a definition of knowledge (or knowing) based on Rooney and Schneider (2002) who 
suggest that knowledge is the result of the interrelated processes of knowing, which are an 
evolving and variable constellation of, for example, the conceptual, cognitive, intuitive, 
aesthetic, emotional, spiritual, axiological, political and motor bases to achievement that are an 
emergent property of relations, and that are justifiably regarded as a reliable basis for action.  
 
The importance of this definition is that it avoids some of the common ontological and 
epistemological flaws associated with the traditional understanding of the nature of knowledge, 
and consequently makes knowledge and its application more understandable as something that is 
researchable in an organizational context. Knowledge is often viewed as an objective ‘thing’, 
rather than the outcome of the active process of knowing (Graham & Rooney, 2001; Pfeffer & 
Sutton, 2000; Rooney, Hearn, Mandeville, & Joseph, 2003; Stacey, 2001). The definition 
proposed by Rooney and Schneider (2002) recognises that knowledge is the result of an 
essentially relational (including social) process of knowing, that it does not have an independent 
existence outside of this process, and that the unit of analysis should therefore be the (living) 
process rather than an inanimate object or highly abstracted nominalisation (Whitehead, 1978). 
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Knowledge is often conceptualised as having two distinct, but interrelated, forms – 
explicit and tacit (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Rooney & Schneider, 2005). Explicit knowledge is 
‘objective’ knowledge which has been codified in a formal and systematic manner (e.g. as a 
technical instruction manual) (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). It is knowledge which is easily 
expressed in symbolic form (i.e. as words, numbers, diagrams etc.) and able to be 
communicated; and which readily lends itself to electronic processing, storage and manipulation 
(Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). Tacit knowledge is ‘subjective’ knowledge which is derived from 
peoples’ experience, ideals, values and emotions, and which is highly personal and context 
specific, and often difficult to formalise, express or share with others (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 
1995; Polanyi, 1967). Tacit knowledge can be further divided into two sub-categories – technical 
tacit knowledge (i.e. know-how, craft, skills) and cognitive tacit knowledge (i.e. “schemata, 
mental modes, beliefs and perceptions so ingrained that we take them for granted” – Nonaka & 
Takeuchi, 1995: 8). All knowledge can be classified according to these two broad dimensions.  
 
Given that knowledge (both tacit and explicit) is the result of the relational process of 
knowing which provides a justifiable and reliable basis for action, and that a ‘decision’ refers to 
a commitment to a course of action, the importance of the application of knowledge in decision 
making becomes clear. We suggest that knowledge needs to be applied as part of the decision 
making process in order to provide a justifiable and reliable basis for the course of action that is 
committed to by those engaged in the decision making process. McKenzie et al. (2011: 421) 
acknowledge the importance of the application of knowledge in decision making processes, 
arguing that knowledge plays a particularly vital role as a tool to avoid “ill-informed decisions”. 
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Effective decisions require the application of accurate knowledge in a timely fashion. The nature 
of this knowledge will vary depending on the nature of the decision required and its focal topic: 
Sound decisions require having the right knowledge in the right place at the right time, to be 
able to act effectively. “Right” knowledge may be different for every decision – some 
decisions require only surface knowledge, some require more investigation and an evidence 
base, some use tacit experience, and other creative insight, intuition and judgment 
(McKenzie et al., 2011: 31)1. 
 
While knowledge of the substantive area in question is necessarily required for making effective 
decisions, Devine and Koslowski (1995), argue that procedural knowledge (i.e. knowledge of 
processes and procedures of decision making) is also required. They suggest further that the key 
source of these knowledges is practical experience, both in terms of the substantive area and in 
decision making as a practice. 
 
Simon (1987) agrees that decisions in an organizational context require substantive 
knowledge of the organization’s specific functional domain, and industry and social environment 
contexts, as well as knowledge of decision making processes. However, he also considers the 
role of emotions and intuition in decision making, exploring how rational (analytic), non-rational 
(intuitive), and irrational (emotional) factors affect decision making processes in organizations. 
He concludes, in accordance with Barnard (1938), that in terms of decisions made by managers 
in organizations, senior managers tend to rely more on intuition than logic or reason. However, 
these apparently ‘non-logical’ decisions are based on knowledge and experience. Intuition relies 
on cognitive patterns, and judgments about the significance and value of those patterns, derived 
from experience, which are applied (often unconsciously) to situations. The application of these 
                                               
1
 It is important to note that McKenzie et al. (2011), like Langley et al. (1995), acknowledge the role of various tacit 
knowledges in decision making. 
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patterns often results in highly effective decisions, the reasons for which may be difficult to 
articulate in formal rational language. 
 
Intuition (in particular) became a creditable aspect of decision making research in 
organizational studies in the 1980s. This arose from the need to consider alternatives to 
traditional rational approaches, which, as stated above, do not lend themselves to situations in 
which decisions have to be made in “a climate characterized by rapid change and at times also 
laden with crisis events” (Agor, 1986: 6). Research has established that senior managers/decision 
makers in organizations are more intuitive than their junior counterparts. The application of 
intuition, which is derived from experience and training, leads to decisions which often leave the 
decision maker with “a feeling of total harmony” (Agor, 1986: 10). As ‘harmony’ is an aesthetic 
concept, it would appear that ‘good’ intuitive decisions are those which appeal to the aesthetic 
knowledge of the decision maker as applied to the decision making process. This potential 
relationship between aesthetic knowledge and decision making has not yet been considered 
empirically in the organizational studies field. 
 
Intuition may be viewed as a cognitive form of tacit experiential knowledge which is 
applied to decision making. Tacit knowledge is generally recognised as important in effective 
decision making (Brockmann & Anthony, 2002: 436). Brockmann and Anthony (2002) argue 
that tacit knowledge is particularly useful in complex and unstructured decision making 
processes. It is used by decision makers to “fill in gaps of missing information, make sense of the 
complex and abstract, distill numerous alternatives, and provide structure” (Brockmann & 
Anthony, 2002: 440).  
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While the role that certain extrarational factors such as emotions (e.g. McKenzie et al., 
2011; Simon, 1987), intuition (e.g. Agor, 1986; Simon, 1987) and tacit knowledge (in general) 
(e.g. Brockmann & Anthony, 2002) play in decision making in organizations has been the 
subject of considerable research, there is virtually no empirical research that explores the 
relationship between aesthetic knowledge (as a specific form of tacit knowledge) and decision 
making in an organizational context. We argue that this is a significant deficiency in the current 
literature given the pervasive nature of the application of aesthetic knowledge in everyday 
practices (Saito, 2001), and its role as an aid to cognition and rational choice (Hansen et al., 
2007; Ramirez, 2005), especially in complex and uncertain situations (Agor, 1986; Davey, 
1989). In order to substantiate this argument further, it is important to consider fully the meaning 
of ‘aesthetic knowledge’ to demonstrate why knowledge of ‘beauty’ and related concepts is 
important for decision making in organizational contexts. 
 
AESTHETIC KNOWLEDGE 
The term ‘aesthetic’, which is derived from the Greek word aisthesis (‘theory of 
perception’), refers to notions of beauty and related concepts such as taste, sublimity and 
pleasure (Bolz & Van Reijen, 1996; Leet, 2004; Strati, 1992; White, 1996). Prior to the rise of 
reason as the dominant philosophical force in modern societies, the cognitive, moral and 
aesthetic realms of understanding were closely related in such a way that “truth, goodness and 
beauty reciprocally defined one another” (Leet, 2004: 11).  
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The development of aesthetics as a movement in modern philosophy is credited to the 
eighteenth century German philosopher Baumgarten, who “developed aesthetics as one of the 
two components of [his] theory of knowledge. On one hand was logic, which looked at 
intellectual knowledge, and on the other hand was aesthetics, which looked at sensory 
knowledge” (Taylor, 2000: 304). Although Baumgarten’s aesthetics was originally designed as 
an extension of rationalism and as an aid to logic, he eventually distanced his aesthetics from 
reason and sought to assert the legitimacy of aesthetic knowledge (i.e. sensory or perceptual 
knowledge) within the dominant logico-rational knowledge framework of his time (Davey, 1989; 
Elgin, 1997; Hammermeister, 2002). Hammermeister (2002: 4) maintains that for Baumgarten, 
aesthetics “refers to a theory of sensibility as a gnoseological faculty, that is, a faculty that 
produces a certain kind of knowledge. Aesthetics is taken very literally as a defence of the 
relevance of sensual perception”. Therefore, Baumgarten’s conceptualisation of aesthetics 
presents it as a sensory epistemology – that is, a way of knowing the world through sensory 
experience (Dean et al., 1997).   
 
Davey (1989) maintains that aesthetics or sensory knowing is, in fact, to where humans 
turn when logic and reason fail. Aesthetics has been increasingly recognised as an ‘activity’ that 
humans engage in on an everyday basis which involves the development of aesthetic sensibilities 
and their application to commonplace experiences of people, objects, institutions, practices and 
situations (Saito, 2001: 94, cf. Featherstone, 2007). 
 
As ‘aesthetics’ refers to notions of beauty and its related concepts, and ‘knowledge’ is the 
outcome of the embedded, relational process of knowing, ‘aesthetic knowledge’ can be 
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conceptualised as a form of knowledge about beauty and its related concepts that emerges from 
peoples’ embodied sensory experience of, and embedded relationships with, phenomena (e.g. 
themselves, other people, animate and inanimate objects, social and other situations etc.) 
(Ewenstein & Whyte, 2007; Fine, 1992; Ramirez, 2005; Ropo & Sauer, 2008; Strati, 1992, 1999, 
2007; Taylor, 2000; White, 1996). Hansen et al. (2007: 546) argue that aesthetic knowledge 
“shapes and precedes all other forms of knowledge” as it forms the basis of the pattern 
recognition and construction that occur during ideation, which in turn precede the “more formal 
conceptualization processes involved in cognition” (Ramirez, 2005: 30).  Not only does aesthetic 
knowledge precede effective cognition, it also acts as an aid to determination in rational thought 
processes. Davey (1989: 112) argues that the application of aesthetic knowledge enables people 
to make a choice among “endless rational possibilities”, by allowing them to select the choice 
which is the most aesthetically pleasing. – that is, the one “in which, like Wittgenstein’s form of 
life, everything coherently fits”.  
 
Aesthetic knowledge is a form of tacit knowledge. Strati (2007: 70) argues that the tacit 
nature of aesthetic knowledge is particularly evident in terms of everyday activities and practices 
in which “we are often aware of being able to do something but unable to describe analytically 
how we do it, to explain it scientifically, and thereby turn it into explicit rather than implicit and 
entirely personal knowledge”. While aesthetic knowledge is somewhat of an ephemeral concept 
(Humphreys, Brown, & Hatch, 2003), it is generally recognised as an instinctive, universal 
human attribute that is shaped by each individual’s historical, social and cultural context (Davey, 
1989; Hammermeister, 2002; Ingram, 1991; Ottensmeyer, 1996; Paxman, 1992-93). Edman 
(1928/39) maintains that the use of aesthetic knowledge forms part of our everyday existence. As 
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such, aesthetic knowledge forms a valid object of research in organizational studies because 
organizations are comprised of people who do not leave their aesthetic knowledge at home when 
they come to work.  
 
However, this does not mean that the content of aesthetic knowledge is universal 
(Bourdieu, 1987; Dean et al., 1997). Strati (1992: 577) argues that aesthetic knowledge is a 
“complex social phenomenon” that is produced and reproduced through social interaction (cf. 
Bourdieu, 1987). As such, aesthetic knowledge is, at least in part, socially constructed, and has a 
different level of importance and meaning for different people, social groups, industries and 
institutions (Bourdieu, 1987; Dean et al., 1997; Tschmuck, 2003).  
 
AESTHETIC KNOWLEDGE AND DECISION MAKING RESEARCH 
There has been a burgeoning interest in the study of aesthetics in various fields in the past 
three decades. This is related to the perception of an aesthetic “boom” in the modern world, in 
which “[m]ore and more elements of reality are being aesthetically mantled and reality as a 
whole is coming to count increasingly as an aesthetic construction” (Welsch, 1996: 1). This 
recognition of the importance of aesthetics in everyday life is reflected in the growing body of 
research exploring aesthetics in an organizational context (e.g. Brady, 1996; Dean et al., 1997; 
Fine, 1992; Kersten, 2008; Ottensmeyer, 1996; Ramirez, 1996; Strati, 1992; Taylor, 2000; 
Taylor & Hansen, 2005; Warren, 2002). The serious consideration of aesthetics in organizational 
studies began only in the 1980’s, primarily as a reaction to the dominance of rationalism and 
positivism in the field, and the resultant “mentalization of organizational life”. However, given 
the nature of aesthetic knowledge as a universal human attribute, and Witz et al.’s (2003) 
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assertion that “[a]esthetics and organization are inseparable”, it is disappointing that it has not 
been more fully researched in an organizational context. Taylor and Hansen (2005: 1213) 
suggest that “[a]esthetic knowledge, like tacit knowledge, is routinely in use in organizations but 
has lacked adequate attention”.  
 
Some specific consideration of aesthetics (as opposed to aesthetic knowledge) and 
decision making has occurred in an organizational context. Warren (2002: 228) maintains that in 
organizations, as in all aspects of human life, “our value judgments, preferences, tastes, choices 
and decisions are heavily influenced by aesthetic considerations” [emphasis added]. Dobson 
(2007: 41) argues that aesthetics form a “holistic justificatory mechanism for business 
decisions”, and, further, that the key decision criteria for modern business organizations should 
be “Is it profitable? Is it ethical? Is it beautiful?” (Dobson, 2007: 45). Drawing on Plato, he 
argues that good decisions are those which have a sense of beauty, and “which enhance the 
quality of life” (Dobson, 2007: 44, cf. Brady, 1996). For Dobson, the failure of decision makers 
to accept the need to apply aesthetics to decision making in organizations amounts to a denial of 
both the role of aesthetics in assisting decision makers to cope with the “chaotic and 
unpredictable” nature of reality, and the limits of applying purely rational processes to decisions 
(Dobson, 2007: 19). However, neither Warren (2002) nor Dobson (2007) has specifically 
considered the application of aesthetic knowledge to decision making processes through 
empirical research. 
 
Strati (2000) also considers aesthetics in relation to decision making. He discusses the use 
of aesthetics as part of rhetorical strategies in strategic decision making, suggesting that both the 
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aesthetics of place and of the presentation of ideas may influence the outcomes of decision 
processes. While he also considers aesthetics in relation to an actual decision (which, e.g., may 
be characterised as a “beautiful decision” or “kitschy and tasteless”), he does not specifically 
explore the application of aesthetic knowledge to decision making processes. 
 
Dean et al. (1997: 429) focus on the aesthetics of decision making processes themselves, 
which, they maintain, “may be seen as an aesthetic creation of the people enacting them” 2. They 
argue that decision makers may experience beauty in terms of the decision process, suggesting as 
an example, that “the complexity, order and symmetry of spreadsheets and other representations 
of alternatives and information about them may be a source of pleasure to decision makers”. 
They call for further research on decision making from an aesthetic perspective, particularly 
focusing on the role of aesthetics as well as of reason and politics in decision making processes. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the extensive research of decision making processes in organizational studies, 
existing models fail to consider explicitly the role of aesthetic knowledge in these processes. We 
see this as problematic, as the application of aesthetic knowledge to phenomena is an essential 
part of what it is to be human; and people are the key decision making entities in organizations. 
Therefore, further research into the application of aesthetic knowledge in decision making 
processes in organizations is required. We see our call for this research as an extension of 
Langley et al.’s (1995) identification of the need to address the “dehumanization” of decision 
making theory in organizational studies. While the ‘convergence’ model of decision making 
                                               
2
 Cf. Kersten (2008: 195) who suggests that “[o]rganizational decision making is affected by people’s aesthetic 
preferences for how decisions should be made”. 
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developed by Langley et al. (1995) based on their detailed criticism of the existing decision 
making models accounts for “extrarational” processes in decision making, it does not explore 
explicitly the role of aesthetic knowledge (an example of ‘extrarationality’) in decision making 
processes. The same criticism can be levied at the intuitive model of decision making.  
 
The existing research clearly establishes that knowledge (substantive, procedural, etc.) 
plays a significant role in ensuring effective outcomes from decision making processes. While 
theorists have acknowledged the importance of tacit and intuitive knowledges in decision making 
processes, the relationship between aesthetic knowledge (as a specific form of tacit knowledge) 
and decision making has not been examined empirically. The existing literature on both 
extrarational forces in decision making and on aesthetic knowledge suggests a number of 
potential roles for the application of aesthetic knowledge in decision making processes. For 
example, Agor’s (1986) research of intuitive decision making suggests that aesthetic knowledge 
(e.g. as expressed in the concept of ‘harmony’) may be used as the ultimate determinant of the 
soundness and efficacy of decisions made in complex and uncertain situations characterised by 
rapid change and incomplete substantive knowledge. Davey’s (1989) conceptualisation of 
aesthetic knowledge as the place to where humans turn when logic and reason fail further 
suggests a role for the application of aesthetic knowledge in decision making situations which 
defy logical and rational analysis. Hansen et al. (2007) offer other, more fundamental roles for 
aesthetic knowledge as both the foundation for all effective cognition and as an aid for choice 
among the potential action options that arise during rational decision making processes (c.f. 
Davey, 1989). We do not, however, wish to speculate further on the role of the application of 
aesthetic knowledge in decision making processes. Rather, we argue that detailed empirical 
11560 
 20
research is required to explore this aspect of decision making processes in organizations. We 
suggest that such research would make an important contribution to the theory and practice of 
organizational decision making. In terms of organizational decision making theory, research into 
the application of aesthetic knowledge in decision making processes would enhance further our 
understanding of the role of extrarational forces in these processes. This research would also 
have important implications for decision making practice in organizations. Establishing the exact 
nature of the role of aesthetic knowledge in decision making would enhance managers’ 
understanding of how effective decision making occurs, especially in complex environments. It 
would also assist them to identify and develop the skills and attributes required by organizational 
members for effective decision making. 
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